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NOTES
AGENCY AS A MEANS OF OBTAINING
JURISDICTION IN NEW YORK -OVER
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
A FAILED THEORY
I. INTRODUCTION
New York and federal courts interpreting section 301' of
the New York Civil Practice and Laws Rule (NY CPLR) have
utilized the law of agency as a means of finding personal juris-
diction over foreign corporations. Agency is traditionally de-
fined as a fiduciary relationship "between two persons, by
agreement or otherwise, where one (the agent) may act on
behalf of the other (the principal) and bind the principal by
words and actions."2 Whether the parties are defined as mas-
ter and servant, or employer and employee, the principal gen-
erally maintains control over the agent.' However, because
independent contractors neither have fiduciary responsibility
to a principal, nor are their actions controlled by a principal,
they are generally excepted from this rule.4
In applying the law of agency metaphorically to personal
jurisdiction, New York courts have held that when a local
subsidiary corporation has served as the de facto agent of its
foreign parent corporation, jurisdiction may be asserted over
1. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 301 (McKinney 1990).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (6th ed. 1990). See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY §§ 1-2 (1958).
3. "It is the element of continuous subjection to the will of the principal
which distinguishes the agent from other fiduciaries and the agency agreement
from other agreements." RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 1 cmt. b.
4. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2(3). Professionals such as attorneys or auc-
tioneers, however, can be both agents and independent contractors since they re-
main fiduciaries despite the fact that their actions are not controlled by their
principals. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 1 cmt. e.
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the foreign parent. When the subsidiary has performed impor-
tant activities within the forum on behalf of the foreign par-
ent-activities that the parent would have had to perform
itself were it not for its reliance on the subsidiary-the for-
eign parent is said to be "doing business" in New York through
its in-forum subsidiary.
In a line of cases interpreting the same statute, however, a
number of district courts within the Southern District of New
York have applied the agency analysis under significantly
different circumstances.6 In these cases, the courts found juris-
diction over foreign subsidiary corporations through the activi-
ties conducted on their behalf within the forum by the local
parent corporations. Thus, in a "flip" of the traditional subsid-
iary-serves-parent relationship, these courts held that the
parent corporations served as de facto agents for their wholly-
owned foreign subsidiaries, despite the fact that the subsidiar-
ies, by definition, were in no position to control the actions of
their parents. By eliminating the element of control from the
agency analysis, courts holding that agency may exist within a
flip relationship define "agent" much as a layperson would use
the word "surrogate": someone who does something on behalf
of someone else.
Not all courts interpreting New York law have been will-
ing to use the blackletter law of agency in so colloquial a man-
ner. Some courts have held fast to the blackletter requirement
that control must exist within an agency relationship and have
refused to find jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary in a flip
agency relationship. This inconsistency in application has re-
sulted in conflicting opinions that effectively eviscerate the
metaphorical use of agency as a reliable test for finding per-
sonal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs seeking to file claims within their
own jurisdiction, multinational corporations seeking to limit
the fora in which claims could be brought against them, and
5. See Palmieri v. Estefan, 793 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Gelfand v.
Tanner Motor Tours, 385 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996
(1968).
6. See Palmieri, 793 F. Supp. 1182; Intersong-USA, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., No. 84
Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11645 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1990); Larball Publish-
ing Co. v. CBS, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Jayne v. Royal Jordanian
Airlines Corp., 502 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Freeman v. Gordon & Breach,
Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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courts seeking reliable precedent for subsequent decisions are
all left without a clear definition of "agency" to guide them.
In Palmieri v. Estefan,7 a recent decision in the line of
cases containing a flip agency relationship, musician-composer
'Eddie Palmieri sued musician-composer Gloria Estefan, the
members of her band the Miami Sound Machine, her New
York-based record company Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.
(Sony Music), and thirty-three of Sony's foreign subsidiaries8
for copyright infringement. On a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dis-
miss for lack of jurisdiction, Judge Leonard B. Sand of the
Southern District of New York ruled that the court had juris-
diction over the foreign subsidiary corporations based on activi-
ties conducted on their behalf in New York by the parent cor-
poration, Sony Music.
The facts and the corporate defendants in Palmieri are
nearly identical to those found in two other Southern District
of New York cases9 decided within the last six years. Nonethe-
less, these cases resulted in conflicting decisions on the same
question of law: whether the parent corporation within the
forum can and did serve as the agent of its foreign subsidiaries
for jurisdictional purposes. Because neither of these district
court decisions has been reviewed by the Second Circuit, in
deciding Palmieri, Judge Sand had the opportunity to do more
than simply follow the reasoning of one case over that of the
other. Judge Sand might have resolved the question of whether
Sony's foreign subsidiaries were present in New York without
relying on the agency analysis. Instead, Judge Sand accepted
the validity of the "flip" agency theory and applied it without
question. Judge Sand's decision, therefore, failed to resolve the
confusion and uncertainty inherent in the agency theory as
applied to NY CPLR section 301.
This Note will discuss the shortcomings and inconsisten-
cies of the agency theory. It will argue that the agency theory
7. 793 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
8. The Palmieri court followed the lead of the defendant Sony Music Enter-
tainment and referred to these 33 foreign corporations as "affiliates" of Sony Music
Entertainment or its domestic parent Sony USA. Nevertheless, this Note will refer
to these corporations as "subsidiaries" since courts, law review articles, and trea-
tises universally refer to corporations whose stock is wholly or mostly owned by
other corporations as "subsidiaries."
9. Intersong-USA, No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11645; Larball,
664 F. Supp. 704.
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should be abandoned because the theory distorts and misap-
plies the traditional law of agency, leading to confusion among
litigants and inconsistent results by the courts. In place of this
theory, this Note will suggest that courts utilize a new jurisdic-
tional test that emphasizes the degree to which a foreign cor-
poration benefits economically from its vicarious activity in the
forum through a forum-based corporation. This "Economic
Benefit Test" avoids the imprecision of the agency theory and
provides the structure for a logical, fact-based analysis.
II. OBTAINING PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS IN NEW YORK
When a foreign corporation is licensed to do business in
New York, its activities within the state automatically place it
under the personal jurisdiction of the courts." However, when
a foreign corporation is not licensed to "transact business with-.
in New York, the courts may still be able to obtain personal
jurisdiction over it through NY CPLR section 301 or 302."
A. NY CPLR Section 301
Comprising just a single sentence, section 301 acknowledg-
es the continued validity of the common law that existed prior
to the statute's 1962 enactment: "A court may exercise such
jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have
been exercised heretofore." 2 Under New York common law,
courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over unlicensed for-
eign corporations on the theory that they are "doing business"
in New York 13 and are therefore "present" in the state "not
occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of perma-
nence and continuity." 4 Once a court finds that a corporation
10. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 301.12 (Supp.
1992).
11. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 302 (McKinney 1990) is New York's long-arm
statute. Agency is also utilized in the case law of § 302, although that use is
strikingly dissimilar from the agency theory which has developed in the case law
of § 301. See infra notes 76-119 and accompanying text. A detailed examination
and analysis of § 302 would be outside the scope of this Note since it is princi-
pally concerned with how agency is used as a means for courts to assert jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations under § 301.
12. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 301 (McKinney 1990).
13. See Simonson v. Int'l Bank, 200 N.E.2d 427 (N.Y. 1964); Bryant v. Finnish
National Airlines, 208 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1965).
14. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917 (N.Y. 1917). See
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is doing business within the forum, "jurisdiction does not fail
because the cause of action... has no relation in its origin to
the business ... transacted." 5
The test for doing business is traditionally said to be "a
'simple pragmatic one,' which varies in its application on the
particular facts of each case." 6 Factors that a New York court
is likely to consider include the following: whether the foreign
corporation "solicit[s] business in the state;.., the existence of
an office [in the state]; and the presence of employees ... in
the state."7 A finding of the existence of only a single one of
these factors will generally be insufficient for a finding of ju-
risdiction. "[A] 'doing business' determination is unique to each
case, requiring consideration of all the facts and circumstances,
without relying unduly on any one factor." 8
Courts may also find that a foreign corporation is doing
business in New York based upon that corporation's relation-
ship with a related entity that is indisputably present within
the state. Jurisdiction could be asserted over the foreign corpo-
ration even if, independently, it does not have enough "con-
tinuous and systematic" 9 contacts within the forum to meet
the doing business test. However, common ownership of a
foreign and a local corporation has never, in itself, been suffi-
cient for a court to find that the foreign corporation is auto-
also Saracero v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 83 F.R.D. 65, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Bulova
Watch Co. v. KL Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1333 (E.D.N.Y 1981); Frummer
v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1967).
15. Susquehanna Coal, 115 N.E. at 918, quoted in Freeman v. Gordon &
Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
16. Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., 565 N.E.2d 488,
490 (N.Y. 1990) (quoting Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 208 N.E. 439, 441 (N.Y.
1965)). See also Keramchemie GMbH v. Keramchemie (Canada) Ltd., 771 F. Supp.
618, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
17. Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1985),
quoted in Keramchemie, 771 F. Supp. at 623 n.5.
18. H. Heller & Co. v. Novacor Chemicals Ltd., 726 F. Supp. 49, 52 (S.D.N.Y.
1988). See, e.g., Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc., 176 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1958) (mere
solicitation in New York is insufficient for finding jurisdiction). But see
Aquascutum of London, Inc. v. S.S. Champion, 426 F.2d 205, 211-12 (2d Cir. 1970)
(under the "solicitation plus" rule, evidence of some other financial or commercial
dealings may be enough to establish presence). See also Artemide SpA v. Grandlite
Design and Mfg. Co., 672 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (presence of defendant's
"wholly independent" sales representatives in New York was insufficient to estab-
lish presence of defendant within the forum).
19. Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1967).
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matically present for jurisdictional purposes." Courts evaluat-
ing such relationships utilize two theories: the "mere depart-
ment" theory and the "agency" theory. A court may exercise
jurisdiction on the foreign corporation by a positive finding
under either or both tests.2'
1. Mere Department
For jurisdictional purposes, the actions of a local corpora-
tion may be imputed to a foreign corporation if both corpora-
tions are commonly owned and the parent corporation main-
tains complete control over its subsidiary, regardless of wheth-
er the subsidiary is separately incorporated.2 The control by
the parent over the subsidiary must be "so complete that the
subsidiary is, in fact, merely a department of the parent."'
The mere department or "alter-ego theory"' is drawn from
the judicial doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.'
Although the New York courts have used the term "mere
department" for many years,26 the four factors used to deter-
mine whether such control exists were not set forth until a
1984 Second Circuit case, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Beech Aircraft Corp.27
The first and most essential factor of the mere department
test is common ownership of the corporations.28 The remain-
20. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336 (1925).
21. See, e.g., Bialek v. Racal-Milgo, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Jayne
v. Royal Jordanian Airline Corp., 502 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Freeman v.
Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); To-
kyo Boeki (U.S.A.), Inc. v. SS Navarino, 324 F. Supp. 361 (1974).
22. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 146,
148 (3d ed. 1983); NORMAN D. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 14 (2d ed.
1971).
23. Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519, 528 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), quoted in Freeman, 398 F. Supp. at 522.
24. Murray E. Knudsen, Note, Jurisdiction Over a Corporation Based on the
Contacts of a Related Corporation: Time for a Rule of Attribution, 92 DICK. L.
REV. 917, 926-27 (1988).
25. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 22, § 146; LATrIN, supra note 22, § 14.
26. Talsky v. Wolf, 177 N.Y.S. 263, 265 (App. Div. 1919); see also Fogg v.
Morris Plan Ins. Soc., 188 N.Y.S. 867, 871 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Lowendahl v. Balti-
more & O.R. Co., 6 N.E.2d 56, 57 (N.Y. 1936). The United States Supreme Court
made use of the term "mere department" as early as 1919. United States v. Read-
ing Co., 253 U.S. 26, 63 (1919).
27. 751 F.2d 117, 120-22 (2d Cir. 1984).
28. Id. at 120.
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ing three factors clarify the extent of the parent's control over
and involvement with its subsidiary. These factors include:
the financial dependency of the subsidiary on the parent
corporation... the degree to which the parent corporation
interferes in the selection and assignment of the subsidiary's
executive personnel and fails to observe corporate formali-
ties... [and] the degree of control over the marketing and
operational policies of the subsidiary exercised by the par-
ent.
29
The development of these factors represents an implicit
acknowledgement by the courts that the essence of the test is
an assessment of the degree to which the foreign corporation
benefits from the activities of the in-state corporation. In this
sense, the mere department test seeks many of the same an-
swers as the agency test discussed below.3"
29. Id. at 120-22.
30. Bulova Watch Co. v. F. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1334 (E.D.N.Y.
1981):
Although the "agency" and "mere department" theories of jurisdiction are
stated as separate principles, it should be clear from the mass of cases
dealing with this problem that a line cannot simply be drawn between
the two .... The apparently distinct notions are metonyms for a juris-
dictional balancing assessing the fairness of requiring an out-of-state
party to defend itself in New York when it derives benefits from in-state
activities. The factors to be weighed include the significance of the New
York business to the defendant's overall activities.
Id. (citations omitted).
One commentator proposes a 'single economic entity" analysis to determine
the 'fairness" of a court's imposition of jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary or a
foreign parent corporation:
It might be proposed that -the parent should be amenable to the jurisdic-
tion of the state where its subsidiary has the requisite minimum contacts
[See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)] whenev-
er it is reasonable to conclude that the parent and subsidiary constitute
a "single economic entity." Under the proposed analysis, the acts of the
subsidiary would be attributed to the parent such that the court would
have judicial jurisdiction over the parent to the same extent that it
would the subsidiary .... Where the corporations constitute a "single
economic entity," the acts of the parent would be attributed to the out-of-
state subsidiary in the same way ....
Charles I. Wellborn, Subsidiary Corporations: When Is Mere Ownership Enough To
Establish Jurisdiction Over The Parent, 22 BUFF. L. REV., 681, 687-88 (1973) (cita-
tions and emphasis omitted).
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2. Agency
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc. and Gelfand
v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.,"' the leading state and federal
cases on the agency theory, are now more than twenty-five
years old. The Second Circuit's decision in Gelfand was directly
influenced by the New York Court of Appeals decision in
Frummer six months earlier.
a. Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.
While staying at the London Hilton on a trip to England,
New York resident Jack Frummer was injured when he slipped
and fell in his hotel bathtub. 2 In a suit filed in a New York
court, Frunmmer sought recovery from Hilton (U.K.), the lessee
and operator of the London Hilton, as well as from Hilton
Hotels Corporation and Hilton Hotels International. The latter
two defendants were Delaware corporations admittedly doing
business in New York. Hilton (U.K.), however, moved to dis-
miss Frummer's complaint against it for lack of in personam
jurisdiction."
The New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that the
plaintiffs 6ause of action did not arise from any contact that
Frummer may have had with Hilton (U.K.) or its agents in
New York. 4 Nonetheless, the court held that jurisdiction may
be asserted over Hilton (U.K.) as it was "'doing business' [in
New York] in the traditional sense"35 of New York CPLR sec-
tion 301 through the activities conducted in the forum on its
behalf by the Hilton Reservation Service.36 The Service,
owned not by Hilton (U.K.), but by Hilton Hotels Corporation
and Hilton Hotels International, was a not-for-profit organiza-
tion created to benefit individual Hilton hotels through its
31. Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 852 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours Ltd., 385 F.2d 116
(2d Cir. 1967).
32. Frummer, 227 N.E.2d at 852.
33. Id.
34. Id. The court therefore held that N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 302, the
state's long-arm statute, was unavailable to Frummer as a basis for finding per-
sonal jurisdiction over Hilton (U.K).
35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 853.
[Vol. XX:I
AGENCY THEORY JURISDICTION
promotional and booking services." The fact that the Service
"both accept[ed] and confirm[ed] hotel reservations at the Lon-
don Hilton"8 allowed the court to hold that "the Service does
all the business which Hilton (U.K) would do were it here by
its own officials." 9 This was "the significant and pivotal fac-
tor"0 in the court's analysis and enabled it to distinguish this
case from Miller v. Surf Properties.4 In Miller, the court had
held that "mere solicitation" by a travel service in New York on
behalf of an out-of-state hotel was insufficient to bring that
hotel within the court's jurisdiction.42
In holding that Hilton (U.K.) was present in New York,
the court did not rely exclusively on the fact that the Hilton
Reservation Service and Hilton (U.K.) were commonly owned,
for as the Supreme Court decided in Cannon Mfg. Co. v.
Cudhay Packing Co., common ownership, in itself, is insuffi-
cient to determine jurisdictional presence.43 Instead, the court
held that common ownership was "significant only because it
gives rise to a valid inference as to the broad scope of the agen-
cy in an absence of an express agency agreement."4
b. Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.
Like Frummer, Gelfand was a case involving a travel
agent, although here the travel agent served as an indepen-
dent contractor for the foreign defendants which were common-
ly owned bus companies based in California and Nevada.45
New York residents Nettie and Phillip Gelfand, passengers on
a Grand Canyon bus tour, sued the defendants for injuries
they sustained when the defendants' tour bus lost a wheel mid-
trip in Arizona.4' Tanner Motor Tours operated its tour of the
Grand Canyon under the name Gray Line by virtue of its
membership in the Gray Line Sight-Seeing Companies Associ-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 857.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 151 N.E.2d 874 (N.Y. 1958).
42. Id. at 876.
43. 267 U.S. 333, 336 (1924).
44. Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Intl, Inc., 227 N.E.2d at 851 (emphasis added).
45. Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).
46. Id.
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ated, a non-profit corporation involved in promoting and publi-
cizing its members' tours to travel agents nationwide.47 Gray
Line's east coast operations were handled for a flat fee by inde-
pendent contractor Herbert DeGraff whose office also repre-
sented other members of the travel industry. As part of his
promotion of package bus tours, DeGraff booked and confirmed
passengers on Tanner's Gray Line tour of the Grand Can-
yon."8 Over a three-year period, DeGraff booked and con-
firmed approximately three-sevenths of the passengers on that
particular tour and generated $120,000 in business for the
defendants each year.49
Based on these facts, the federal district court held that it
had no jurisdiction over the defendants because their contacts
with Gray Line Associated and Degraff in New York lacked
"some integrating factor, like directness of control, or the for-
malization of service. . . 2 0 Soon after this decision, however,
the New York Court of Appeals made its ruling in Frummer
which had a substantial affect on the Second Circuit's interpre-
tation of section 301. On appeal, the Second Circuit found that
the "integrating factor" sought by the district court was con-
tained within DeGraffs activities.5 For the court, that "inte-
grating factor" was also the "decisive test":52 "the [reservation]
Service does all the business which [defendant corporation]
could do were it here by its own officials."53 The court then in-
terpreted these words to mean that
a foreign corporation is doing business in New York "in the
traditional sense" when its New York representative provides
services beyond "mere solicitation" and these services are
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did
not have a representative to perform them, the corporation's
own officials would undertake to perform substantially simi-
lar services.54
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 119.
50. Id. at 120. The district court case is unreported and unavailable on
Westlaw.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 120-21 (quoting Frunmier v. Hilton Hotels Intl, Inc., 227 N.E.2d
851, 853 (N.Y. 1967)).
54. Id.
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In conclusion, the court held that Tanner's reliance upon
DeGraff for three-sevenths of its business on that particular
tour not only established a systematic course of doing business
in New York,55 but satisfied the due process requirements of
International Shoe v. Washington.56
3. Flip Agency
Flip agency exists when a court asserts in personam juris-
diction over a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary corporation
based on the activities undertaken on its behalf by its in-forum
parent corporation. Those courts that have used the agency
theory in these flip circumstances have not, on the whole, been
restrained by the blackletter rules of agency. Rather than
basing their decisions on whether the subsidiary/principal
could have controlled the actions performed on its behalf by its
parent/agent, these courts examine the degree to which the in-
forum corporation serves the economic needs of the foreign
corporation.57 These courts derive justification for such an
analysis from the holding of Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours
which states that a foreign corporation is doing business in
New York whenever its New York "representative" provides it
with services that are so important to the foreign corporation
that without them the foreign corporation would have to come
into New York and perform them itself.58 The word "represen-
tative" is critical in the flip agency theory since the word is
completely nonspecific, designating neither parent and subsid-
iary corporation nor principal and agent.
Three decisions from the Southern District of New York
illustrate the flip agency theory: Freeman v. Gordon and
Breach, Science Publishers, Inc.;59 Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc.; and Larball Publishing Co. v. CBS, Inc.61
55. Id.
56. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
57. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 4.02.1 (1983):
"The 'agency' metaphor relies essentially on function-the economic relationship of
the local components activities to the corporate group of which it is part."
58. Gelfand, 385 F.2d at 121.
59. 398 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
60. 83 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
61. 664 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Larball, a music publishing company,
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In Freeman, a 1975 decision, the district court noted that
"[ulnder more usual circumstances, the conduct of a New York
subsidiary is sought to be imputed to a foreign parent with the
goal of subjecting the parent to the jurisdiction of our courts.
Here, a reverse set of facts pertains."62 Freeman, the former
editor of the International Journal of Magnetism, filed a
breach of contract action against the journal's publishers. Since
the journal was published by the London-based, wholly-owned
subsidiary of a New York corporation, the subsidiary filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The flip of what the Freeman court characterized as the
"Cusual circumstances" 3 did not deter the court from following
the Second Circuit's analysis in Gelfand and denying the mo-
tion to dismiss. Disregarding a rigid application of the agency
analysis-under which an in-forum parent corporation could
not serve as an agent for jurisdictional purposes because the
parent could not be controlled by its foreign subsidiary-the
court held that "the rules developed by the New York courts
for application in the converse (subsidiary rendering parent
present) situation apply equally to the matter at bar.""
In Saraceno, a New York resident sought recovery for the
injuries 'she allegedly suffered when a can of household pesti-
sued CBS Inc., CBS Records, and several of CBS's foreign subsidiaries for infring-
ing the copyright of a song Larball owned. Larball alleged that Miguel Bose, a
recording artist of the CBS Record's Spanish subsidiary, copied the music from one
of Larball's songs without its permission. This subsidiary released the infringing
song in Spain, Puerto Rico and the United States. Soon thereafter, Ray Coniff, an
American artist with CBS Records, recorded his own version of Larball's song.
Within two years, nearly a dozen other foreign subsidiaries had recorded and re-
leased the Bose and Coniff versions. Id. at 706.
The court's tacit acceptance of the flip agency theory is implicit in the in-
troduction to the court's analysis of the jurisdictional question:
While the existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is, in and of itself,
an insufficient basis for finding in personam jurisdiction over the subsid-
iary, there are two theories pursuant to which a subsidiary may be found
to be present in the jurisdiction: (1) if the parent acts as its agent; or (2)
if the subsidiary is a "mere department" of its parent.
Id. at 766-07 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
62. Freeman, 398 F. Supp. at 521.
63. Id.
64. Id. Although the court did find that it had jurisdiction over the foreign
subsidiary, it declined to state whether it relied on either the mere department or
the agency theory. Instead, the court held that "while two separate corporate enti-
ties have been established, only one commonly owned enterprise exists which, in
order to function, must rely upon the joint endeavors of each constituent part." Id.
at 522.
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cide exploded while she was visiting her family in Spain. The
defendant was a Dutch subsidiary of S.C. Johnson, a Wiscon-
sin corporation licensed to do business in New York.65 The
subsidiary had manufactured the insecticide and subsequently
marketed it in Spain.6" In her suit, the plaintiff claimed that
the Dutch subsidiary was subject to the court's jurisdiction
since the subsidiary was a mere department of the New York
parent corporation,67 and that the parent corporation served
as the agent of the subsidiary in New York.68
Although the court ultimately accepted the subsidiary's
argument that jurisdiction could not be asserted based on
either the mere department or agency theory, the court69 held
that it was nonetheless possible for an agency relationship to
exist in circumstances where the parent, rather than the sub-
sidiary corporation, resided in the forum.
Most of these cases involve a New York subsidiary and a
foreign parent. We find it immaterial for these purposes that
the foreign corporation over which jurisdiction is sought to be
established is the subsidiary of the corporation licensed to do
business in New York, rather than the parent."
By 1987 the flip agency theory was so well established
(and yet still unnamed) that the court in Larball employed the
theory without fanfare. In a copyright infringement suit, CBS
filed a motion to dismiss Larball's claims against its foreign
subsidiaries for lack of personal jurisdiction. Larball argued
that the subsidiaries should be subject to the court's jurisdic-
tion under both the mere department and agency theories of
65. Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 83 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 68.
68. Id. at 67.
69. Judge Leonard Sand decided Saracero; he would later decide Palmieri.
70. Saraceno, 83 F.R.D. at 67 n.5. See also Jayne v. Royal Jordanian Airlines,
502 F. Supp. 848, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1980): "The relationship of parent and subsidiary,
though not by itself jurisdiction-conferring, gives rise to an inference of a broad
agency relationship between the two, even when, as here, it is the parent that is
within the jurisdiction and not the subsidiary." In Jayne, the estates of two New
York plane crash victims sued the Jordanian-based Arab Wings, the operator of
the aircraft and a near wholly-owned subsidiary of the Royal Jordanian Airlines
(a.k.a. ALIA). ALIA was Jordan's government-owned airline. It conceded that its
own activities within New York subjected it to the court's in personam jurisdiction.
Id. at 851.
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section 301. The court neither gave justification for utilizing
flip agency nor acknowledged that agency traditionally flows in
the opposite direction (i.e., the forum-based subsidiary acts as
the agent for the foreign parent).7'
The court relied on Frummer72 to find that jurisdiction
over the foreign subsidiaries could be asserted under the agen-
71. In Jayne, although the court did cite to Freeman, the citation referred
only to Freeman's discussion of the mere department and agency theories of § 301,
and not to the flip agency theory. Jayne, 502 F. Supp. at 856 (citing Freeman v.
Gordon & Breach Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
Indeed, when the court later cited Frummer for that court's definition of agency
under § 301, the words contained within the brackets of the quotation speak to
the Larball court's own particular interpretation of agency: "In Frummer v. Hilton
Hotels Int'l., the Neiv York Court of Appeals held that an agency relationship
would be found "where [one corporation] does all the business which [the other
corporation] could do were it here by its own officials." Larball Publishing Co. v.
CBS, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 704, 707 (quoting Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc.,
227 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967) (emphasis add-
ed)).
Not only does this bracketed information indicate that the court believed
that either the subsidiary or the parent can serve as the agent for jurisdictional
purposes, but the information could also indicate that the court believed that agen-
cy may exist between unrelated corporations. If that was the court's position, it
would broaden the scope of the agency theory under § 301, which heretofore had
been limited almost exclusively to suits involving parents and their related subsid-
iary corporations. The only exception that comes to mind is Gelfand v. Tanner
Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967), where the presence of an indepen-
dent contractor working in the forum on behalf of the foreign defendant was suffi-
cient to bring the defendant under the court's jurisdiction.
However, the New York Court of Appeals appears not to approve of the
application of the agency theory unless the foreign and local corporate entities are
related: "Where, as here, there exists truly separate corporate entities, not com-
monly owned, a valid reference of agency cannot be sustained." Delagi v.
Volkswagenwerk AG, 278 N.E.2d 895, 897 (N.Y. 1972).
The court is probably alluding to the language in Frummer where common
ownership was "significant only as it gives rise to a valid inference as to the
broad scope of an agency agreement . . . ." Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc.,
227 N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1967). It is difficult to reconcile this statement with the
fact that the Delagi court acknowledged the Second Circuit's decision in Gelfand, a
case where the foreign defendant was unrelated to DeGraff, the in-state sales rep-
resentative. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text. Not only was DeGrafl's
company not related to the defendant's, but DeGraff was an independent contrac-
tor whose actions were not controlled by the defendants.
The Delagi court may have been trying to say that a court may infer that
an agency relationship inherently exists between related corporations, and that
actual jurisdiction would then be "established by the activities conducted on its
behalf by its agent." Delagi, 278 N.E.2d at 897 (quoting Frummer, 227 N.E.2d at
854). However, for agency to exist between "truly separate corporate entities," a
stronger, more traditional showing of an agency relationship is necessary.
72. Frummer, 277 N.E.2d at 853.
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cy theory. Central to the court's analysis was the existence of
"matrix3 licensing agreements" between the CBS in New
York and all of its foreign subsidiaries. Judge Duffy summa-
rized these "matrix agreements":
[T]he agreements require the subsidiaries to grant to CBS
the exclusive right to manufacture and distribute recordings
made from'the subsidiaries' matrices in the "outside territo-
ry", defined as the world other than the country in which the
subsidiary is located. Pursuant to the agreements, CBS un-
dertakes to distribute recordings to its subsidiaries' [sic] in
the United States and grants sublicenses to its subsidiaries
elsewhere."4
For the Larball court, the critical issue was the nature of
the economic relationship between the two corporate entities.
The court found that CBS had almost absolute control over the
world-wide distribution of its subsidiaries' recordings, and that
these services were so vital to the subsidiaries that if CBS did
not act on their behalf, they would find it necessary to perform
these services personally in New York."
These three cases demonstrate that without an appellate
court decision to the contrary, several federal courts in the
Southern District of New York apparently believe that their
section 301 analysis should not be constrained by a traditional
definition of agency. By expanding upon the holdings of
Frummer and Gelfand, these courts readily disregarded the
need for a principal to have control over an agent within an
agency relationship. Of far greater relevance for these courts is
a foreign corporation's economic reliance upon the acts under-
taken on its behalf by an in-forum corporation.
4. Narrow Interpretations of Agency Under Section 301
At the same time that some judges in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York were willing to expand the scope of the agen-
cy theory, several other judges, both within the Southern Dis-
trict and in state courts, have insisted that control by a foreign
73. "A matrix is defined as 'any device . . . used directly or indirectly, in the
manufacture of Records and which is derived from a Master Recording, and every
duplicate of such device.'" Larball, 664 F. Supp. at 706 n.2.
74. Id. at 707.
75. Id. at 707-08.
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corporation over its in-forum representative is an essential
factor in the agency theory under section 301. These judges,
whose decisions include DelBello v. Japanese Steak House;76
Selman v. Harvard Medical School;" Como v. Commerce Oil
Co.;78 and Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc.,79 were willing to de-
emphasize or ignore the relevance of the economic benefits
accruing to the foreign entity in favor of a stricter adherence to
the law of agency and the perceived right of corporations to
limit liability. In defending their position on the element of
control, these judges did not look to prior decisions decided
under section 301. Instead, they ruled that control was a nec-
essary factor in determining in personam jurisdiction under
section 301 by applying agency as it had been defined by
courts that had decided cases under a completely different
statute: CPLR section 302, New York's long-arm statute.
The DelBello, Selman, Como, and Intersong-USA courts
did not explain why they found that agency as applied to sec-
tion 302 should be applied interchangeably to section 301.
Section 302, the "transacting business" statute, covers cases of
"specific jurisdiction": i.e., where the cause of action must arise
out of a transaction of business by a defendant or her agent
within the forum." On the other hand, section 301, the "doing
business" statute, covers cases of "general jurisdiction": i.e.,
where the cause of action may arise outside the forum."'
In DelBello, DelBello and his partner Breslow were New
York residents who had applied for, and received, a license to
open a restaurant in New York from the defendant, a Florida
franchisor of "oriental-type steak house[s]. " "2 When the part-
ners sued the franchisor for breach of contract, they claimed
that the franchisor should be subject to the jurisdiction of the
New York court by reason of the franchise agreement: the
76. 352 N.Y.S.2d 537 (App. Div. 1974).
77. 494 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
78. 607 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
79. No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11645 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1990).
80. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990) states that "a court
may exercise jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administra-
tor, who in person or through an agent: 1. transacts any business within the
state . . . ." (emphasis added). See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries
on N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 302 at C302:2-3 (McKinney 1990).
81. Id. § 301 at C301:1-3.
82. DelBello v. Japanese Steak House, 352 N.Y.S.2d 537, 539 (App. Div.
1974).
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partners argued that under the agreement they became agents
of the franchisor, that their acts within the forum became the
acts of the franchisor, and that such acts "constituted doing
business" in the forum.83
In reversing the lower court's decision' and granting the
franchisor's motion to dismiss, the Appellate Division stated
that the partners could not have been the agents of the fran-
chisor because the franchisor exercised no control over the
partners. 5 As precedents for its decision, the court did not
look to cases that examined agency under section 301, but
instead followed two state Appellate Division cases applying
section 302.6
In Selman, a Southern District of New York case, the
plaintiff, a medical student at a foreign university, sued the
American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC) and a num-
ber of other domestic medical schools that had denied his
transfer request. AAMC, an Illinois corporation with offices in
Washington, D.C., was the developer of the Medical College
Admissions Test. This nationwide exam.was administered by
the American College Testing Program (ACTP), an indepen-
dent Iowa corporation serving AAMC as an independent con-
tractor. Selman contended that the court had jurisdiction over
AAMC because ACTP acted as an agent on behalf of AAMC
while it administered the admissions exam in New York.
The court held ACTP was not the agent of AAMC and,
therefore, the court had no jurisdiction over AAMC under sec-
tion 301."' The court reasoned that: (1) there was no evidence
83. Id. at 540. Although the court did not expressly state under which statute
DelBello and his partner sought to bring the franchisor within the jurisdiction of
the court, the only conclusion that may be drawn from the court's opinion is that
the statute was § 301, since the court's decision concerns whether the franchisor
was "doing business" in New York through the plaintiffs. Later in the opinion, the
court also considered, and rejected, the plaintiffs' efforts to bring the franchisor
within the court's jurisdiction under § 302.
84. Unreported decision by the Special Term of the Supreme Court in Erie
County, New York.
85. DelBello, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 540. The court also stated in dictum that the
partners' efforts to establish themselves as the agents of the franchisor must fail
because "[t]he independent acts in New York for their own purposes by residents
in a contract relationship with a non-resident person or corporation in another
state may not be attributed to the non-resident so as to become the acts of the
non-resident in New York." Id.
86. Lodge v. Western New York Dance Studios, 286 N.Y.S.2d 632 (App. Div.
1974); Hodom v. Stearns, 301 N.Y.S.2d 146 (App. Div. 1969).
87. Selman v. Harvard Medical School, 494 F. Supp. 603, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y.
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that the two corporations were commonly owned; (2) there was
no evidence of an agency agreement; and (3) there was no
evidence that AAMC had any control over the alleged agent,
ACTP. 5 The court came to this holding not by citing to the
agency test as defined by Frummer and Gelfand,8 9 but by cit-
ing instead to Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG and Louis Marx
& Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co. Ltd."'
Louis Marx clearly expressed that its test for agency relat-
ed to section 302, and not to both jurisdictional statutes:
To constitute an agent for purposes of the statute [i.e., section
3021, the alleged agent must have acted in this state for the
benefit of and with the knowledge and consent of the non-
resident and the non-resident must exercise some element of
control over the agent.9"
However, the Selman court, in quoting the Louis Marx deci-
sion, deleted the critical first phrase of that sentence--"To
constitute an agent for purposes of the statute... "-and re-
placed it with a phrase implying that the definition was appli-
cable to both section 301 and section 302: "Moreover, in order
to be an agent for purposes of New York personal jurisdic-
tion .. .
1980). The court also held that it had no jurisdiction over AAMC under § 302
principally because: (1) AAMC did not have sufficient contacts within the forum to
constitute the "transaction of business" under § 302(a)(1); (2) since Selman was
living in Mexico at the time the alleged injury took place, there was no tortious
act within the forum affecting the plaintiff within the forum under § 302(a)(2). Id.
88. Id. at 611.
89. See supra notes 31-56 and accompanying text.
90. The Delagi court held that where "there exists truly separate entities, not
commonly owned, a valid reference of agency cannot be sustained." 278 N.E.2d
895, 896 (N.Y. 1972); see supra note 71. The court did not hold, however, that
common ownership is always essential to the existence of agency. See WEINSTEIN,
supra note 10, § 301.16 at 3-40. Nor does Delagi hold that control is essential to
agency under § 301; control was a factor for the court, but only in cases where
the plaintiff was claiming that a wholly-owned subsidiary was a mere department
of a parent corporation. Delagi, 278 N.E.2d at 897.
91. 453 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
92. Id.
93. Selman v. Harvard Medical School, 494 F. Supp. 603, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(emphasis added). It is interesting to note that Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy was
the author of both the Selman opinion and the Larball opinion decided seven
years later. In Larball, Judge Duffy selected only one case-Frummer-as the
precedent he needed to find that CBS acted as th6 agent of its foreign subsidiar-
ies for purposes of determining jurisdiction under § 301. In sharp contrast to
Selman, the only mention of "control" in Larball was the control that the court
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Judge John F. Keenan wrote the opinions in Como v. Com-
merce Oil Co.,94 decided in 1985, and Intersong-USA v. CBS
Inc.,95 decided in 1990. Both cases addressed the question of
whether the acts of an alleged agent within the forum may be
attributed to a foreign corporation for the purposes of section
301 jurisdiction. Both opinions used cases decided under sec-
tion 302 to hold that jurisdiction could not be asserted because
of the absence of control by the foreign corporation over the in-
forum agent.
Como involved a suit filed in the Southern District of New
York by a group of investors against, among others, Commerce
Oil and Miller Drilling, both foreign corporations.96 The inves-
tors alleged that Miller Drilling was present in the forum
through the forum-based activities of seven limited partner-
ships which raised money in New York for oil and gas projects
outside the state. These partnerships hired Miller Drilling to
drill and operate the wells.9"
The court held that the seven limited partners did not
serve as Miller Drilling's agents for the purposes of section
301.98 The court acknowledged that Miller Drilling "requested,
or at least consented to, the solicitation of investors by the
New York-based limited partnerships,"9 and that Miller Drill-
ing clearly benefited from these solicitations."0 However, the
court was "not convinced that Miller Drilling exercised suffi-
cient control over these partnerships"'' so that the limited
partners' efforts in the forum might be attributed to the defen-
dant. The two cases the court used as precedent for this hold-
said CBS (the parent-agent) had over the distribution of the recordings produced
by its subsidiaries (the subsidiary-principals). Thus, in Larball, the court found
that agency existed under § 301 even when the agent had control over its princi-
.pals. Such an analysis is a substantial departure from the analysis Judge Duffy
used in Selman.
94. 607 F. Supp 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
95. No. 84 Civ. 0998, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11645 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1990).
96. Because the court held that Miller Drilling's contacts with New York did
not meet the standards set by the Court of Appeals in Laufer v. Ostrow, 434
N.E.2d 692, 694-95 (N.Y. 1982), Miller Drilling was not found to be doing business
in New York directly through its own actions. Como, 607 F. Supp. at 339.
97. Como, 607 F. Supp. at 339-40.
98. Id. at 340.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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ing were Louis Marx v. Fuji Seiko, Inc.0 2 and Delagi v.
Volkswagenwerk AG of Wolfsburg Germany.1"' However, as
discussed earlier, Louis Marx examined agency under section
302."4 On the other hand, Delagi only discussed the issue of
control as it related to the mere department test of section 301,
and not in terms of the agency theory. 5
Five years after Como, Judge Keenan again applied the
standards for agency under section 302 to assert jurisdiction
under section 301. The facts of Intersong-USA Inc. v. CBS
Inc.' were strikingly similar to Larball, where jurisdiction
was found over foreign subsidiaries under the agency theory.
As in Larball, a music publishing company sued CBS and its
foreign subsidiary record companies for infringing the copy-
right to a song created by one of Intersong's artists. When the
foreign subsidiaries filed a motion to dismiss for lack of person-
al jurisdiction, Intersong claimed that the court had jurisdic-
tion over the subsidiaries under section 301 since CBS acted
on behalf of the subsidiaries within the forum as an agent.
10 7
The court did not, however, use Judge Duffy's analysis in
Larball to resolve the agency issue. Agreeing with the foreign
subsidiaries, the court held that the matrix agreements"0 '
represented nothing more than a mere licensing arrangement,
through which the affiliates obtain royalties." 9 Finding that
"[there [was] no evidence that CBS does anything on behalf of
the affiliates,""0 th6 court held that "the relationship be-
tween CBS and its affiliates [was] that of licensor-licens-
102. 453 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
103. 278 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1972). See supra note 90.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
105. "[This court has never held a foreign corporation present on the basis of
control, unless there was in existence at least a parent-subsidiary relationship. The
control over the subsidiary's activities, we held, must be so complete that the
subsidiary is, in fact, merely a department of the parents." Delagi, 278 N.E.2d at
897 (citations omitted).
106. No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11645 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1990).
107. Intersong also claimed that the foreign subsidiaries were mere departments
of CBS, Inc. In resolving the mere department issue, the court used Judge Duffy's
analysis in Larball to hold that the relationship between these commonly-owned
corporate entities did not meet the four-part test of Volkswagenverk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117, 120-22 (2d Cir. 1984). See
supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
109. Intersong at *11.
110. Id. at *14.
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ee,"" rather than principal-agent pursuant to section 301.
Judge Keenan held that CBS could not be the agent of its
foreign subsidiaries since "[t]here is no suggestion, nor could
there be, that the foreign affiliates exert any type of control
over CBS.""' The court supported these holdings by relying
on a definition of agent that was derived from case law inter-
preting section 302 rather than section 301, and by misapply-
ing the facts of Gelfand.
The court distinguished this case from Gelfand"3 by not-
ing that the subsidiaries "do not rely on CBS for their major
profits.""' In Gelfand, the foreign defendant corporation de-
pended upon the services of its New York promoter for three-
sevenths of the defendant's business on a particular out-of-
state bus tour. In contrast, because Judge Keenan found that
CBS's foreign subsidiaries did not depend entirely upon CBS
for their economic survival,"5 he consequently held that
"CBS works with the matrix agreements for its own bene-
fit."" '6 This analysis disregards the fact that the New York
promoter in Gelfand was not responsible for three-sevenths of
the foreign defendant's entire yearly income. Instead, the pro-
moter was responsible for a substantial portion of that one
tour, which was just one of many tours conducted by the de-
fendants."7
The court agreed with the foreign subsidiaries that under
section 301 an agent is "one who has 'acted in this state for the
benefit of and with the knowledge and consent of the non-resi-
dent and the non-resident must exercise some element of con-
trol over the agent."" 8 While the court credited this defini-
tion to H. Heller & Co. v. Novacor Chemicals Ltd., a case in
which one of the issues concerned agency under section 301,
the exact quote actually comes fourth-hand from Louis Marx &
111. Id. at *16.
112. Id. at *15.
113. Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).
114. Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc. No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11645, at *13.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *14.
117. Gelfand, 385 F.2d at 118-19.
118. Intersong, No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11645, at *11-12 (quot-
ing H. Heller & Co. v. Novacor Chemicals Ltd., 726 F. Supp. 49, 55 (S.D.N.Y.
1988)).
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Co. v. Fuji Seiko, which defined an agent under section
302."9 Once again, therefore, a court within the Southern
District had applied the case law related to section 302 to a
case arising under section 301.
5. Conclusion
The cases described in this section and in the previous
section on flip agency demonstrate that courts have addressed
issues of in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations in
two ways under section 301. Under the first method of analy-
sis, courts use the legal concept of agency broadly and meta-
phorically. A court using this method examines the relation-
ship .between the foreign and local corporations in terms of the
economic benefits gained by the foreign corporation as a result
of the local corporation's actions on its behalf within the forum.
If the benefits received are so substantial that, under the rule
of Gelfand and Frummer, the local corporation does all the
work in the forum that the foreign corporation would do using
its own employees if it were actually in the forum, then that
court will hold that the local corporation served as the agent of
the foreign corporation. The court will then assert jurisdiction
over the foreign corporation whether the foreign corporation is
the parent corporation or simply a subsidiary.
Under the second method of analysis, courts address the
degree to which the foreign corporation has benefited from its
contacts within the forum, but adhere to a narrow interpreta-
tion of agency under section 301. They will not assert jurisdic-
tion over the foreign corporation unless it can be shown that a
traditional principal and agent relationship existed respective-
ly between the foreign corporation and the in-forum corpora-
tion. Since Gelfand and Frummer, the leading appellate cases
on the issue, took a broader view of agency, the courts using
this method of analysis have had to look elsewhere to find pre-
cedent for their views. That precedent has come from cases in
which the cause of action arose under section 302 rather than
section 301.
119. Heller borrowed the definition from Selman v. Harvard Medical School,
494 F. Supp. 603, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Selman borrowed it from the source, Louis
Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co., 453 F. Supp. 385, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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III. PALMIERI V. ESTEFAN: A RESTATEMENT OF FLIP AGENCY
In Palmieri v. Estefan,"° foreign subsidiaries of CBS Re-
cords (now owned by Sony Music Entertainment)121 were
sued in a copyright infringement action in the' Southern Dis-
trict of New York for the third time'22 since 1987. As they did
in Larball in 1987 and Intersong in 1990, these foreign
affiliaties filed motions to dismiss the infringement claims for
lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming they were not present
within the forum because they did not have sufficient contacts
within the forum to constitute doing business under section
301.
Plaintiff Eddie Palmieri, composer and musician, alleged
that in 1989 the defendants Gloria Estefan and two members
of her band, The Miami Sound Machine, infringed the copy-
right Palmieri has owned since 1981 on a song entitled
"Paginas De Mujer."'1 3 In his suit filed in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York on May 7, 1991, Palmieri not only sued
Estefan and her band, but also her New York recording compa-
ny Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.,'24 and its thirty-three
wholly-owned subsidiary music companies around the
world.'25 Palmieri claimed that the court had personal juris-
diction over the moving defendants under both the mere de-
partment and the agency theories of NY CPLR section 301.
Central to Palmieri's argument for agency was the presence of
a matrix agreement'26 between Sony Music and its subsidiar-
120. 793 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
121. The Sony Corporation is the successor in interest to CBS Records Inc.,
having purchased CBS Records in 1988. Id. at 1184.
122. The two prior cases are Larball Publishing Co. v. CBS, Inc., 664 F. Supp
704 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) and Intersong-USA Inc. v. CBS Inc., No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11645 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1990). See supra notes 71-75 and 106-
19 and accompanying text.
123. Palmieri, 793 F. Supp. at 1183.
124. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. (Sony Music) is wholly owned by Sony
Corporation of Japan.
125. Within the motion to dismiss, each moving defendant claimed to be incor-
porated under the laws of its own country and to operate under those laws. In
identical statements known collectively as "Affiliate Affs.," each affiliate insisted
that it produces, manufactures, and distributes musical recordings only within its
own country or territory. See Palmieri, 793 F. Supp. at 1184.
126. The court in Palmieri stated:
A matrix agreement grants each moving defendant the exclusive right to
manufacture and distribute within its territory any recording in the rep-
ertoire of Sony Music and any other party to a matrix agreement with
1993]
192 BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XX:I
ies. In a decision dated May 18, 1992, United States District
Court Judge Leonard B. Sand ruled that the court had person-
al jurisdiction over these defendants under NY CPLR section
301, but only under the agency theory."7
Sony Music. Each moving defendant in turn grants to Sony Music and
any other party to a matrix agreement the exclusive right to manufac-
ture and distribute within their respective territories any selection from
the defendant's repertoire.
Each moving defendant has the power to decide whether to release
a selection from Sony Music or another moving defendant's repertoire,
and the matrix agreement does not obligate a moving defendant to do so.
If the moving defendant does decide to release a selection, it pays a fee
to the moving defendant from whose repertoire the selection comes.
Id. at 1185 (citations omitted). See also supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
127. In deciding that the mere department theory would not apply to the rela-
tionship between Sony Music and its subsidiaries (the moving defendants), Judge
Sand relied upon and agreed with the decisions of two previous cases involving
essentially the same defendants.
In both Larball Publishing Co. v. CBS, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), and Intersong-USA, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11645, *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1990), the plaintiffs claimed infringement of
their copywritten music by the wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries of CBS Records
in New York. When CBS Inc. sold CBS Records and all of its foreign subsidiaries
to Sony Inc. of Japan in 1988, Sony Inc. renamed the New York corporation Sony
Music Entertainment, Inc. and maintained the matrix agreements between the
New York parent and its foreign subsidiaries.
Utilizing the four-part test for mere department found in Volkswagenwerk
v. Beach Aircraft, 751 F.2d 117, 120-22 (2d Cir. 1984) (see also supra notes 27-29
and accompanying text), Judge Sand found that common ownership, the essential
element in the test, existed among the defendants. Palmieri, 793 F. Supp. at 1188.
Even if some of the moving defendants were not directly owned by Sony Music in
New York, every defendant was owned by Sony Corp. of Japan. As he continued
his analysis of the relationship between the defendants, Judge Sand noted addi-
tional ties:
There is no question that Sony Music exercises some control over the
activities of the moving defendants. As discussed supra, Sony Music does
require approval of major financial decisions of the moving defendants,
reviews their budgets and is provided with regular financial reports by
them. Sony Music has on occasion guaranteed at least one of the
affiliates' financial obligations. Sony Music also approves key personnel
decisions, and assists the affiliates in strategy for negotiations with art-
ists, and in formulating various business policies.
Id.
Despite finding that Sony Music does exercise a degree of control over its
foreign subsidiaries and despite this enumeration of business contacts between
parent and subsidiaries, Judge Sand held that Sony Music's level of involvement
was insufficient to meet the requirements of the Volkswagenwerk test, id, at 120,
and that the moving defendants were not "wholly dependent upon [Sony Music's]
financial support to stay in business." Id. (quoting Volkswagenwerk, 751 F.2d at
121).
AGENCY THEORY JURISDICTION
In rejecting the necessity of control within the agency
relationship, Judge Sand was not swayed by Judge Keenan's
holding in Intersong5. that agency could not be found for the
purpose of asserting in personam jurisdiction under section
301 unless the foreign corporation exhibited control over the
acts of the in-state agent. Instead, Judge Sand referred to
Frummer129 and emphasized that:
The interrelatedness of the corporations is the factor on
which the courts have focused, rather than on the "control" of
one by the other. In the context of related corporate entities,
the Frummer standard remains the "decisive test" for agency,
and the courts have not required that control be proven as an
element for an agency relationship to obtain jurisdiction. 3 °
Judge Sand agreed'31 with Judge Duffy's characterization
of the relationship between CBS and its foreign subsidiaries in
Larball:
It is clear that were CBS [Sony Music] not handling the sub-
sidiaries [sic] worldwide sales, the subsidiaries would be
required to perform this function themselves. Thus, I find
that CBS [Sony Music] is conducting all the business its
subsidiaries' [sic] could do were they present by their own
officials."'
Judge Sand's decision to follow Judge Duffy's analysis may
128. Intersong-USA, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11645, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1990).
129. "[Tlhe common ownership of two corporations may 'give rise to a valid
inference as to the broad scope of the agency.'" Palmieri, 793 F. Supp at 1193
(quoting Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1967)).
130. Id. Judge Sand then cited to several cases which explicitly state either
that it is immaterial whether, for the purposes of determining jurisdiction, it is
the parent corporation which serves as the in-state agent for its foreign subsidiary.
See Jayne v. Royal Jordanian Airlines Corp., 502 F. Supp. 848, 856 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (defendant, a Jordanian air charter service, was brought under the court's
jurisdiction through the activities on its behalf by its Jordanian parent corporation,
which was amenable to jurisdiction in New York). See also Saracero v. S.C. John-
son & Son, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 65, 67 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Titu-Serban Ionescu v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 434 F. Supp. 80, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (all stating that it is immateri-
al whether the parent or the subsidiary serves as the agent); Freeman v. Gordon
& Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
131. Palmieri, 793 F. Supp. at 1192.
132. Larball Publishing Co. v. CBS, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 704, 707-08 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
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have been influenced by the financial figures supplied by Sony
Music and its subsidiaries.133 Although a confidentiality stip-
ulation between the parties forced the judge to speak vaguely
about the exact amounts involved,"' he stated that it was
"clear that the [moving] defendants derive hundreds of millions
of dollars in profits from sales due to acts signed by Sony Mu-
sic."'35 He also noted that the defendants conceded in their
memorandum of law that "a substantial percent of the sales of
the moving defendants are attributable to product licensed to
the moving defendants under the matrix agreement."36
In sharp contrast to Judge Keenan's position on essentially
identical matrix agreements in Intersong,'37 Judge Sand
agreed with the plaintiffs argument.38 that the matrix agree-
ments were more than "mere licensing arrangements." 39 Ac-
cording to the plaintiff, the foreign subsidiaries are not merely
licensing the recordings, they are acquiring the very product
that they will then market and profit from in their own coun-
tries. " This ready-made product comes to them through
careful research, promotion and the nurturing of scores of
musicians and composers by the parent corporation in New
York. In addition, the foreign subsidiaries use the matrix
agreements to license and market the music product developed
in their own countries to the rest of the world.'
133. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants' initial memoranda of law regarding
the motion to dismiss, as well as all discovery materials, are protected from public
disclosure through a stipulation of confidentiality filed with the court on December
13, 1991. The information contained within these documents is, therefore, unavail-
able for this Note.
134. Palmieri, 793 F. Supp. at 1186 n.8: "We refrain from citing specific per-
centages to accommodate the parties' confidentiality stipulation. The precise figures
do not alter the legal analysis."
135. Id. at 1191.
136. Id. at n.10. Because it is unlikely that the financial fortunes of Sony Mu-
sic and its subsidiaries changed significantly for the better in the course of two to
three years, it is not unreasonable to conclude that in Intersong, Judge Keenan
was either unimpressed by this financial information or Intersong's counsel was
unable to unearth as much information in discovery as Palmieri's.
137. Intersong-USA, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11645, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1990).
138. Palmieri, 793 F. Supp. at 1191.
139. Id. at 1190.
140. Id.
141. Judge Sand summarized his interpretation of the matrix agreements as
follows:
In the present case, much of the product marketed abroad derives from
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The opinions of both Judge Sand in Palmieri and Judge
Keenan in Intersong referred to Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc.,' a case in which the actions of the New York par-
ent corporation did not create an agency relationship as de-
fined by Frummer.' In Palmieri, Judge Sand distinguished
Saraceno: "Unlike Saraceno, the [Sony] subsidiaries are not
foreign corporations with little contact or relationship to New
York."' Thus, for Judge Sand, the determining factor in
granting jurisdiction was the actual locus of the contacts.
In contrast, Judge Keenan in Intersong found that
Saraceno was "applicable"45 to the facts before him. Because
he characterized the matrix agreements as "a mere licensing
arrangement,""6 he held that the foreign subsidiaries had
"little contact in New York"" 7 and that CBS conducted no ac-
tivities in New York on behalf of its subsidiaries. 48
After Judge Sand held that the court had personal juris-
diction over Sony's foreign subsidiaries under the agency theo-
ry of section 301, he addressed the question of whether an
assertion of jurisdiction in these circumstances would offend
constitutional due process requirements. In a single paragraph,
the court cited International Shoe Co. v. Washington' and
its progeny,5 ' and acknowledged the need for the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant has "certain minimum con-
tacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit
the recordings of artists signed by Sony Music in New York. Second, the
foreign subsidiaries market their material exclusively through Sony Mu-
sic, the New York corporation. And it is through Sony Music and the
interlocking matrix agreements that the foreign subsidiaries are able to
market their products throughout the world.
Id. at 1192.
142. Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See
supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
143. Saraceno, 83 F.R.D. at 67-68.
144. Palmieri, 793 F. Supp. at 1192.
145. Intersong-USA, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11645, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1990).
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322,
1334 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)).
148. Id. at "15-16.
149. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
150. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.""5' The court then concluded its discussion of the due
process requirement by holding that the "record demonstrated
'purposeful availment' by the defendants"'52 and that such
availment met the requirements of due process.'
IV. ANALYSIS
State and federal courts applying New York law disagree
on the method of application of the law of agency to issues of
jurisdiction. These conflicts exist because the use of the agency
theory to resolve jurisdictional issues is in itself seriously and
inherently flawed. Although disagreement between courts
about the application of a law to particular facts is neither
unusual nor inappropriate, it is problematic when the law is so
vague that courts as well as litigants are uncertain of a law's
meaning. Since courts cannot apply vague, ill-defined laws
with any consistency, potential parties are left to wonder
whether their associations with New York corporations will
subject them to jurisdiction by New York courts.
151. Palmieri v. Estefan, 793 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
152. Id. The court is referring here to Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 316
(1958).
153. Id. Although Judge Sand's handling of the due process requirement may
appear to be perfunctory and incomplete, state and federal courts have held that
finding that a defendant "does business" in the forum automatically satisfies the
Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements for personal jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017, 1022 (2d Cir. 1978)
("The constitutional standard of due process may be met by fewer contacts, howev-
er, than those required under the more restrictive statutory test of 'doing busi-
ness,' . . . as the New York Court of Appeals implicitly recognized in Simonson v.
International Bank." (citations omitted)); Freeman v. Gordon and Breach, Science
Publishers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519, 526 n.4, (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Implicit in our hold-
ing of 'doing business' is the holding that [the defendant] has acted in New York
'with a fair measure of permanence and continuity' and has purposely availed
itself of the privilege of conducting business activities in this forum."). See also
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1967):
[L]itigation in a foreign jurisdiction is a burdensome inconvenience for
any company. However, it is part of the price which may properly be
demanded of those who extensively engage in international trade. When
their activities abroad, either directly or through an agent, become as
widespread and energetic as the activities in New York conducted by [the
defendant], they receive considerable benefits from such foreign business
and may not be heard to complain about the burdens.
Id. at 854.
AGENCY THEORY JURISDICTION
A. The Agency Theory Distorts the Rules of Agency
The agency theory is vague and ill-defined principally
because it is based on a distorted application of the traditional
law of agency. Courts apply the law of agency metaphorically
rather than literally to issues of jurisdiction arising under
section 301. In a traditional literal agency analysis, the exis-
tence of a fiduciary relationship between two parties may
cause one party (the principal) to be liable vicariously for acts
performed on its behalf by the other party (its agent). But
when agency is applied to cases arising under section 301, a
court is deciding whether to assert jurisdiction over the foreign
corporation, not whether to find the foreign corporation vicari-
ously liable for the acts of an in-forum corporation.
For example, in Gelfand,"' the plaintiffs, New York resi-
dents, alleged that they were injured by negligent acts of Tan-
ner Motor Tours, a foreign bus company, and not by any negli-
gence on the part of Harold DeGraff, Tanner's promotional
representative in New York. The plaintiffs were simply at-
tempting to sue Tanner in a convenient forum for Tanner's
alleged torts in another state. DeGraff was not a party to the
cause of action in negligence and there was no attempt to hold
Tanner liable for any actions of DeGraff. However, because
Tanner received significant economic benefits from its contacts
in New York through DeGraff, the Second Circuit held that
Tanner was doing business in New York and was therefore
present for jurisdictional purposes. This holding would not
have been possible if the Second Circuit had applied agency
traditionally rather than metaphorically.
The ability of the principal to control the actions of the
agent is a necessary factor in establishing the existence of a
traditional agency relationship.'55 Without the ability to con-
trol its agent, the principal could not be vicariously liable for
the agent's activities. However, when the agency theory is used
for jurisdictional purposes, some courts have held that control
was not a necessary factor in determining whether an agency
relationship existed. Indeed, neither of the two leading agency
154. Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).
155. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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cases under section 301, Frummer"' and Gelfand, viewed
control over the in-forum agent as a relevant factor in assert-
ing jurisdiction over the foreign defendants.
In Frummer, where the court held that the Hilton Reser-
vation Service in New York acted as the agent for Hilton Ho-
tels (U.K.), it never discussed the element of control that is
required in a traditional agency relationship. 5' Instead, the
court used the fact that the Reservation Service and Hilton
Hotels (U.K.) were commonly owned as a way to find "a valid
inference as to the broad scope of the agency in the absence of
an express agency agreement.. .1"" The court did not ex-
plain why common ownership would give rise to such a "valid
inference" of agency, nor did the court define the parameters of
the "broad scope of the agency." The court left unresolved the
issue of whether common ownership was a vital element in
determining the existence of an agency relationship, or wheth-
er agency, as it was defined in Frummer, could exist between
independently-owned corporations.
Likewise, in Gelfand, neither common ownership nor con-
trol were vital factors in determining the existence of an agen-
cy relationship under section 301. "The court in Frummer spe-
cifically disavowed any reliance upon the corporate relation-
ship of the two Hilton subsidiaries other than that 'it gives rise
to a valid inference as to the broad scope of the agen-
cy .... ', " Promotional representative Harold DeGraff was
an independent contractor and therefore unrelated to the de-
fendant Tanner Motor Tours, yet the court held that his efforts
156. Frummer, 227 N.E.2d at 851.
157. Id. See also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PRO-
CEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS §
4.02.1 (1983) ("Although 'agency' is asserted as the justification, the existence of
such economic interdependence does not make the local corporation an 'agent' of
its foreign component so as to bind the foreign component as its principal or sub-
ject it to substantive liability.").
158. Frummer, 227 N.E.2d at 854 (emphasis added).
159. Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968) (emphasis added) (quoting Frummer, 227 N.E.2d
at 854). But see Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. of Wolfsburg, Germany, 278
N.E.2d 895, 898 (N.Y. 1972), in which the Court of Appeals held that "control"
was a vital element in the mere department analysis. "[Tihis court has never held
a foreign corporation present on the basis of control, unless there was the exis-
tence at least of a parent-subsidiary relationship. The control over the subsidiary
must be so complete that the subsidiary is, in fact, merely a department of the
parent." (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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in the forum on behalf of the foreign defendants were sufficient
for the court to find jurisdiction over Tanner Motor Tours. The
court also made no mention of control as a vital element in
determining whether an agency relationship existed. Apparent-
ly, the court did not consider control to be a requirement for a
finding of an agency relationship. Since DeGraff was autho-
rized to confirm tour reservations for the foreign defendants,
he had the "power to make the one employing him a party to a
transaction."6 ' Nevertheless, he could not be considered an
agent in the traditional 6' sense because under the facts of
the case he was "subject to no control over his conduct."62
Since agency is applied metaphorically for jurisdictional
purposes, one might reason that the metaphor could easily be
adapted to a variety of circumstances. But the striking split of
opinions among courts about the control requirement indicates
that the agency theory's inherent imprecision is its greatest
flaw. Rather than serving as a way for courts to simplify a
complicated sets of facts, the agency theory impedes an analy-
sis of the jurisdictional question. As Judge Cardozo wrote in
his opinion in Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co.,
"[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."
161
The solution to Judge Cardozo's concerns cannot be for the
courts to define precisely the parameters of the agency theory,
for if the metaphor is strictly defined it ceases to be a meta-
phor. However, the courts could abandon the agency theory
and replace it with a simple test which would assist courts in
determining jurisdictional presence through an evaluation of
economic benefits the foreign entity receives from its contacts
in the forum.
B. Inconsistent Application of the Agency Theory
Courts cannot apply vague and ill-defined legal theories
with any degree of consistency and predictability because the
application of that theory will vary with each interpretation.
Because the agency theory uses the law of agency metaphori-
160. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. b.
161. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. b.
162. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. b.
163. 155 N.E.2d 58 (N.Y. 1926).
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cally, courts are particularly challenged to arrive at consistent
decisions, and sharp differences of opinion unavoidably result.
If the Palmieri and Intersong courts differ so sharply in their
interpretations of the law, having applied the same theory to
virtually identical facts, the law is obviously so unclear that
potential litigants cannot possibly know how to act to avoid
liability. After Judge Keenan's decision in Intersong, CBS had
good reason to believe that its foreign subsidiaries would be
exempt from appearing in the Southern District if similar suits
arose in the future.
Larball,'" Palmieri, and the other flip agency cases dem-
onstrate that control continues to be an unnecessary factor in
determining agency,' despite the presence of a line of dis-
trict court cases that have held otherwise by relying on the
more traditional definition of agency used in causes of action
arising under section 302, New York's long-arm statute."'
These differences in interpretation among the courts exist
because the courts have received little guidance from the ap-
pellate courts subsequent to Frummer and Gelfand. Cases such
as Delagi"'6 and DelBello"6 ' served only to confuse later
courts that have tried to understand agency under section 301
by looking to, and misapplying, agency as it is defined pursu-
ant to section 302."9 More recent decisions from the Court of
Appeals dealing with the agency theory in the context of sec-
tion 301, such as Landoil Resources v. Alexander & Alexan-
der,70 fail to develop or clarify the law any further, relying
instead on past declarations of the law in Frummer, Gelfand,
and Delagi.Y Indeed, the agency theory, as applied to section
164. Larball Publishing Co. v. CBS, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
165. See supra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 77, 87-88, 91-102, 106-19 and accompanying text.
167. Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. of Wolfsburg, Germany, 278 N.E.2d 895
(N.Y. 1972). See supra notes 81, 90, and 105 and accompanying text.
168. DelBello v. Japanese Steak House, Inc., 352 N.Y.S.2d 537 (App. Div.
1974). See supra notes 82 and 85 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 76-119 and accompanying text.
170. 565 N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 1990).
171. In Landoil, the Court of Appeals addressed a certified question from the
Second Circuit: whether a syndicate of insurance underwriters based at Lloyd's of
London was subject to suit in New York based on the activities of a Lloyd's ad-
ministrative department overseeing, from London, an insurance policy trust fund
located in New York. Among its claims, the plaintiff alleged that the syndicate
was under the court's jurisdiction because Lloyd's administrative department
served as the syndicate's agent in the forum.
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301, has not changed appreciably since the Frummer and
Gelfand decisions in 1967.172 Although the observance of pre-
cedent is both the rule and the life-blood of the common law,
appellate courts must seize the opportunity to clarify past deci-
sions that fail to lend proper guidance to lower courts.
The importance of the Palmieri decision lies not so much
in what it does, but rather in what it does not do. Judge Sand's
holding that Sony Music's foreign subsidiaries are subject to
the personal jurisdiction of the court establishes no new prece-
dent. Even the atypical flip adaptation of the agency theory
that was applied by the Palmieri court has been previously
used. Although its holding is contrary to that of Judge
Keenan's in Intersong, it is essentially identical to that of
Judge Duffy in Larball five years earlier.7 ' It is, of course,
The court chose not to decide whether agency actually existed, holding that
it would not find jurisdiction, even assuming, arguendo, that an agency relation-
ship actually did exist. For the court to find jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
through its agent, the agent would have to be located in New York and the agent
should do all its solicitations in New York. Otherwise, "[i]t cannot be said to be
performing acts in New York on a systematic and a continuous basis or for the
benefit of the [s]yndicate." Id.
In arriving at this holding, the court referred only to Frummer, Gelfand,
and Laufer v. Ostrow, a Court of Appeals case in which the court found jurisdic-
tion over the foreign defendant through its own, and not an' agent's, continuous
and systematic activities in the forum. In dicta, the Laufer court refers to its
decision in Delagi, but only in terms of Delagi's requirement that there be control
by the parent over the subsidiary in cases utilizing the mere department theory.
434 N.E.2d 692, 695 (N.Y. 1982) (citing Delagi, 278 N.E.2d at 898).
172. The continued reliance on Frummer can be seen in Judge Sand's remarks
during an appearance before the court on July 9, 1992 by attorneys for both sides
subsequent to the Palmieri decision on May 18, 1992. During that appearance, the
court sought to ascertain whether it should submit a certified question to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit or whether it should forego the certified
question and allow the case to be bifurcated, splitting liability and damages:
Suppose I hear from counsel who are defendants on that with respect to
all aspects of this, other than argument on the merits of Frummer and
agency and so on. If I may be colloquial, I've done my time on that
issue. I've had my say. I understand the issue is not free from doubt,
but otherwise I would not be raising the question of certification.
Transcript of Appearance, Palmieri v. Estefan, 91 Civ. 3098 (LBS), (S.D.N.Y.), July
9, 1992, page 5, line 23 to page 6, line 5.
In a stipulation between the parties dated September 22, 1992 (filed with
the court on September 29, 1992), the parties agreed to bifurcate the trial. If the
court determines that an infringement of copyright did not incur, neither Sony
Music Entertainment nor its foreign subsidiaries would be liable, mooting the need
for the certified question.
173. It would be fair to say, however, that Judge Sand's analysis is more deep-
ly and soundly based in legal precedent than Judge Duffy's, despite the fact that
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unrealistic to expect that a district court judge would eliminate
or even redefine agency theory, substituting the metaphoric
application of the law of agency with an analysis less prone to
subjective adaptation and misinterpretation. Such changes are
more likely to come from appellate courts. Nevertheless,
Palmieri is at least a missed opportunity to challenge the va-
lidity of a legal theory that courts continue to apply inconsis-
tently.
C. The Agency Theory and Public Policy
Perhaps the most important reason for a corporation to
incorporate subsidiaries separately is its desire to limit corpo-
rate liability. But that legitimate desire must be balanced
against a plaintiff's need for appropriate recourse for harms
caused by foreign corporations. Courts that decline to assert
jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries in circumstances of flip
agency because they cannot envision an application of agency
in which the parent is in no position to control the actions of
its subsidiary, fail to consider the ramifications of their deci-
sions on plaintiffs.
For example, in Intersong, the court's decision not to assert
jurisdiction meant that the plaintiff's only alternative was to
file suit against each of the foreign subsidiaries in its own
country. Clearly, most plaintiffs would find this to be an im-
possible imposition that would essentially force them to aban-
don their claims. By focusing principally on the question of
whether the relationship between the foreign and in-forum
corporations met the strict requirements of a traditional appli-
cation of agency, the Intersong court failed to consider the
United States' interest in providing American plaintiffs with
appropriate recourse to torts committed by foreign parties."4
The court's failure is troubling considering the substantial
benefits that the foreign subsidiaries derived from the matrix
agreements and other contacts in the forum."5
they both arrive at the same conclusion. Judge Sand was less conclusory in his
analysis than Judge Duffy because he realized that his decision ran directly
against Judge Keenan's and that it was likely that the foreign subsidiaries would
appeal.
174. Individual states would also have such an interest when a suit involved
parties located in different states, as was the case in Gelfand.
175. See supra note 153 for a quotation from Frummer that presents a view-
202 [Vol. XX: I
AGENCY THEORY JURISDICTION
The conflict among courts that disagree about the validity
of flip agency could conceivably be resolved by an appellate
court decision stating that, henceforth, courts may not assert
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the foreign corporation controlled the actions
of the in-forum corporation. Such a decision would eliminate
assertions of jurisdiction in flip agency circumstances and
preserve the integrity of the law of agency.
However, the integrity of the law of agency is clearly not
at issue. The existence of an agency relationship, in itself, is
essentially meaningless. The courts should be concerned with
ascertaining whether the foreign corporation derived such
economic benefits from its relationship with an in-forum corpo-
ration that it could be fairly said to be doing business within
the forum. Because the agency theory does not provide a clear
and predictable means for evaluating the depth to which the
foreign corporation has benefited economically from its con-
tacts within the forum, it cannot serve to guide the behavior of
potential litigants. Unless the theory is abandoned, many
plaintiffs with valid claims will continue to be denied access to
the courts for what in essence amounts to technical deficiencies
under the law of agency.
D. Economic Benefit Test
1. The Need for a Test
Judge Sand's application of the agency theory places too
great an emphasis on a "familial" relationship 76 between the
local and foreign defendants1" and too little on what should
be at the heart of the court's in personam jurisdiction over the
point that is sympathetic to the interests of the in-forum plaintiff.
176. "The interrelatedness of the corporations is the factor on which courts
have focused, rather than on the 'control' of one by the other. In the context of
related corporate entities, the Frummer standard remains the 'decisive test' for
agency . . . ." Palmieri v. Estefan, 793 F. Supp. 1182, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (cita-
tions omitted).
177. This dependence is likely induced by an oft-quoted excerpt from Frummer
v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1967), addressing the com-
mon ownership of the local and foreign corporations: "[Tlhe fact that the two are
commonly owned is significant only because it gives rise to a valid inference as to
the broad scope of the agency in the absence of an express agency agreement."
Nothing, however, in that sentence restricts such inferences only to commonly
owned corporations.
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defendants-the quality of the contacts the foreign defendant
has with the forum through its agent.'78 The holding of
Palmieri is actually based on the degree to which the foreign
record companies depend on the activities of Sony Music in
New York.
In the present case, much of the product marketed abroad
derives from the recordings of artists signed by Sony Music
in New York. Second, the foreign subsidiaries market their
material in New York exclusively through Sony Music, the
New York corporation. And it is through Sony Music and the
interlocking matrix agreements that the foreign subsidiaries
are able to market their products throughout the world....
For all the reasons above, we find it approptiate to obtain
jurisdiction over the foreign affiliates on the basis of their
agency relationship with Sony Music. 7'
However, the clarity of that holding is clouded by the
court's attempt to follow precedent and place those contacts in
the context of an agency relationship between local parent and
foreign subsidiary.
The leading federal case interpreting New York's agency
theory, Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours,50 held that an inde-
pendent promotional representative, legally an independent
contractor, served as the agent of two foreign bus companies
for the purpose of section 301 jurisdiction. If an independent
contractor can serve as an agent under the statute, it is clear
that it is not necessary for there to be common ownership
between principal and agent. 8' The courts have also held
178. See Murray E. Knudsen, Note, Jurisdiction Over a Corporation Based on
the Contracts of a Related Corporation: Time for a Rule of Attribution, 92 DICK. L.
REV. 917, 931 (1988).
179. Palmieri, 793 F. Supp. at 1192.
180. 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968). See supra
notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
181. See Engebretson v. Aruba Palm Beach Motel, 587 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y.
1984):
Defendants argue that Frummer precludes the exercise of authority here
because [the in-forum sales representative] is an independent entity
whereas the agent there was a corporate affiliate. There is language in
certain opinions indicating that some common ownership is vital. Howev-
er, common ownership is not required .... I find that the presence of
an agent in New York with the undisputed authority to bind the foreign
principal by confirming reservations is sufficient to warrant a finding
that the Aruba defendants are "doing business" in New York.
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that control by the principal over the agent is not vital to the
existence of agency."8 2 Therefore, without the need for either
common ownership or control, the only truly vital criterion for
agency is that the foreign defendant receive a significant eco-
nomic benefit from its contacts in the forum. This is the "deci-
sive test""s contained in Frummer's holding: "[T]he [local en-
tity] does all of the business which [the foreign corporation]
could were it here by its own officials. " "
Assuming that Frummer's "decisive test" does relate exclu-
sively to the degree to which the foreign defendant receives
forum-related economic benefits, the law of agency, even when
applied metaphorically, is an inaccurate and inefficient method
of identifying and evaluating these benefits. Not only is agency
an inappropriate metaphor for asserting jurisdiction because it
is more generally recognized and utilized as a method of at-
taching vicarious liability, but the law of agency's traditional
emphasis on the ability of the principal to control the acts of
her agent has been viewed as irrelevant by many courts, in-
cluding the New York Court of Appeals (Frummer) and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(Gelfand). Thus, the agency theory, as applied to section 301,
should be replaced with a test that specifically identifies and
evaluates the nature of the foreign defendant's contacts with
the forum as well as the benefits received by that defendant
from these contacts.
2. The Proposed Test
The purpose of the Economic Benefit Test (EBT) is to give
courts a simple method of determining whether they should
assert personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations alleged to
be doing business in the forum through the economic ties they
have with in-forum corporations.' By replacing the agency
Id. at 850 (citations omitted).
182. See supra notes 57-75 and 128-130 and accompanying text.
183. Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).
184. Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1967)
185. The EBT is certainly not the first attempt to find a reasoned, fact-inten-
sive method of determining whether a court should claim personal jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation said to be doing business in the forum. Charles Wellborn
devised the "single economic entity" analysis as a way of determining when "the
acts of the subsidiary would be attributed to the parent such that the court would
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theory, the EBT will free courts from the inherent limitations
of the law of agency. These limitations continue to affect judi-
cial decision-making,'86 despite instances where the courts
had attempted to show that agency was simply being used as a
metaphor for substantial, purposeful financial availment with-
in the forum.'
The EBT is not designed to affect a court's ability to find
that a foreign corporation is doing business in the forum
through its own "ongoing and continuous" activities within the
forum.'88 Nor will the test replace the mere department anal-
ysis,"' since that theory operates to impute jurisdiction vicar-
iously upon a parent corporation only when the parent's con-
trol over that subsidiary is so strong that both entities are
viewed as one. In contrast, the EBT should be utilized in cases
involving relationships between parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions which may or may not be viewed as a single entity, and
have judicial jurisdiction over the parent to the same extent that it would the
subsidiary." Charles I. Wellborn, Subsidiary Jurisdiction in New York: When is
Mere Ownership Enough to Establish Jurisdiction Over the Parent, 22 BUFF. L.
REv. 681, 688-89 (1973). The applicability of this analysis is limited because it is
essentially a mere department analysis and places too great an emphasis on the
"familialr relationship between the corporations. Such an emphasis would prevent
the analysis from being used in cases such as Gelfand where the in-forum corpora-
tion was an independent contractor.
More recently, Murray E. Knudsen proposed a "rule of attribution." Murray
E. Knudsen, Note, Jurisdiction Over a Corporation Based on the Contacts of a
Related Corporation: Time for a Rule of Attribution, 92 DIcK. L. REV. 917 (1988).
The scope of this rule is broader than that of the "single economic entity" since it
is designed to apply to related as well as independently-owned corporations. Id. at
944. As a practical tool, however, the rule fails to ask the specific questions neces-
sary to determine the degree to which the foreign corporation benefits from its
vicarious involvement in the forum:
To attribute the in-state activities of a corporation to a related out-of-
state corporation, there are two essential criteria. First, the in-state cor-
poration. must carry on commercial activity on behalf of the out-of-state
corporation. Second, the out-of-state corporation must purposefully avail
itself of those in-state activities. This purposeful availment or intent
requirement can be further broken down into two sub-elements. The out-
of-state corporation must know that the in-state activities are being done
on its behalf and the out-of-state corporation must accept the benefit de-
rived from these in-state activities . . . . It is a "rule" that is not
conclusory, but one that turns upon the individual facts of each case.
Id. at 944 (citations omitted).
186. See supra notes 76-119 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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in cases where the foreign and in-forum corporations are com-
pletely independent and unrelated.
This new test is principally an economic one because eco-
nomics is at the heart of the relationship between the foreign
and in-forum corporations. Moreover, economic benefit has
been the prevailing "yardstick" by which the leading agency
cases have measured a foreign entity's contacts with the fo-
rum.' The proposed test is not, however, a bright line which
can be reduced to mathematical certainty; it also requires a
fact-centered, case-by-case judicial evaluation based on the
evidence. In addition, this test allows a court to consider policy
issues and fairness to the parties in order to yield a more just
result.
3. The Four Factors of the EBT Test
In determining whether the foreign corporation has re-
ceived sufficient economic benefits through its association with
an in-forum corporation to subject itself to New York jurisdic-
tion, a court should weigh the following factors: 1) evidence of
a deliberate financial relationship between the forum-based
and foreign corporations; 2) the degree to which the in-forum
corporation can contractually bind the foreign corporation; 3)
the duration of the financial relationship; and 4) the foreign
corporation's actual financial involvement in the forum as a
percentage of its expenses, sales, or net profits.
The first inquiry in the EBT analysis is whether the for-
eign corporation consciously became involved in a financial
relationship with the in-forum corporation. If a foreign
corporation's involvement in the forum was not deliberate, but
came about solely through the unilateral actions of an in-forum
corporation, the analysis need go no further. An assertion of a
court's jurisdiction under such circumstances would violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it
would meet neither the "minimum contacts" standard of In-
190. See Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 120-21 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968) ("In our view, the decisive test is that
upon which the court in Frummer relied, 'the [in-forum corporation] does all of the
business which the [foreign corporation] could do were it here by its own offi-
cials.'") (emphasis added) (quoting Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Infl, Inc., 227 N.E.2d
851, 853 (N.Y. 1967).
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ternational Shoe.9' nor comport with "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." 9' Framing the issue in this
way obviates the need for the court to differentiate between
commonly and separately owned corporations. Common owner-
ship is not a relevant factor in the EBT, just as it was not in
Frummer and Gelfand which both held that common owner-
ship was "significant only because it gives rise to a valid infer-
ence as to the broad scope of the agency in the absence of a
valid agency agreement....",1"3 However, common ownership
is vital to the mere department test of Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp.'94 If the foreign and
forum-based corporations are commonly owned and meet all
four factors of the mere department test, a court could impute
the independent and unsolicited actions of the forum-based
corporation to the foreign corporation for jurisdictional purpos-
es.
95
Once the court has sufficient evidence to determine that
the foreign corporation has consciously established a financial
relationship with an in-forum corporation, the court should
determine the extent of that involvement by addressing the
remaining factors of the EBT.
The second factor, whether there is evidence of a contrac-
tual arrangement in which the foreign corporation has per-
mitted the in-forum corporation to act on its behalf is directly
related to the first inquiry. An agreement between two such
entities would serve as prima facie evidence of a deliberate
financial relationship which would, therefore, satisfy the first
inquiry of the EBT.
Unlike the agency theory, the EBT is unconcerned with
the issue of control within the corporate relationship. Although
some courts continue to interpret the agency theory as requir-
ing that evidence of control by the foreign corporation over the
in-forum corporation is vital to an assertion of the court's juris-
diction,' 9 the relevant inquiry under this factor of the EBT is
191. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
192. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
193. Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 852 (N.Y. 1967),
quoted in Gelfand, 385 F.2d at 120.
194. 751 F.2d 117, 120-22 (2d Cir. 1984). See supra notes 28-30 and accom-
panying text.
195. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 75-119 and accompanying text.
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simply the degree to which the in-forum corporation has been
permitted to bind the foreign corporation contractually.
Once a court finds evidence of a contractual arrangement,
the court should then look to whether the arrangement relates
to an essential part of the foreign corporation's business, or is
merely peripheral or incidental. For example, in Gelfand v.
Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.,'97 the in-forum travel agent had
the power to make and confirm reservations for the foreign
corporation's Grand Canyon bus tours. This contractual ar-
rangement went to the very heart of the Tanner Motor's finan-
cial viability. It is likely that the corporation would have been
hurt significantly without such an agreement since it would
not have otherwise had access to customers from the lucrative
New York market. On the other hand, if Tanner's contact with
the forum simply consisted of an agreement authorizing a New
York-based employment agency to place classified ads in New
York papers for clerical positions at Tanner Motor's California
headquarters, the Second Circuit might not have asserted its
jurisdiction. Such an agreement would be only indirectly relat-
ed to Tanner's corporate purpose and it would have a negligi-
ble effect on Tanner's financial viability.
The third factor, the duration of the financial relation
between the forum-based and foreign corporations, is signifi-
cant because the longer a foreign corporation has maintained
its financial contacts with the in-forum corporation, the easier
it will be for a court to justify that the foreign corporation is
doing business in the forum pursuant to section 301. Although
a single tortious act that is actually committed within the
forum,9 ' or a tortious act committed outside the forum but
having direct effect within the forum,'99 may be sufficient for
a court to hold that the foreign corporation has transacted
business in New York pursuant to New York's long-arm stat-
ute, section 301 requires that the foreign corporation's contacts
with the forum occur "not occasionally or casually, but with a
fair measure of permanence and continuity."
20 0
The fourth inquiry, a determination of the foreign
corporation's financial involvement in the forum as a percent-
197. Gelfand, 385 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1967)
198. N.Y. C1v. PRAC. L. & R. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
199. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
200. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917 (N.Y. 1917).
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age of its expenses, sales, or net profits, enables the court to
assess the relative importance of that involvement to the cor-
poration. If the financial activity generated within the forum
represents a substantial percentage of the foreign corporation's
expenses, sales, or profits, the court could have strong evidence
to find that the benefits accruing to the corporation outweigh
the burdens it may experience defending itself within the
forum.20
1
Assisting the court in making such a determination would
be an assessment of the likelihood that the foreign corporation
would either form an agreement with another in-forum corpo-
ration or come into the forum itself should the existing contrac-
tual agreement come to an end. The court might also deter-
mine that the in-forum corporation provides special services or
has expertise in areas crucial to the foreign corporation's oper-
ations that would be costly or difficult to replace. Alternatively,
if the contractual agreement produces relatively insignificant
sales and profits for the foreign corporation, or if corporate
purchases within the forum are de minimis, the court may find
that such evidence would serve to preclude an assertion of its
jurisdiction. For example, in Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc., °2 evidence showing that the foreign corporation used in-
forum suppliers for only one-fiftieth of one percent of its needs
was persuasive in the court's decision not to assert its jurisdic-
tion.20
3
4. The EBT and Palmieri v. Estefan
In order to demonstrate that the EBT would be a viable
and superior replacement for the agency theory, it will be help-
201. See Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Intl, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1967):
We are not unmindful that litigation in a foreign jurisdiction is a burden-
some inconvenience for any company. However, it is part of the price
which may properly be demanded of those who extensively engage in
international trade. When their activities abroad, either directly or
through an agent, become as widespread and energetic as the activities
in New York conducted by [the foreign corporation], they receive consider-
able benefits from such foreign business and may not be heard to com-
plain about the burdens.
Id. at 852.
202. 83 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying
text.
203. Saraceno, 83 F.R.D. at 68.
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ful to see how a court might apply the test to the facts of
Palmieri v. Estefan. °4
First, the matrix agreements existing between the foreign
subsidiary record companies and Sony Music in New York20 5
are strong evidence of a deliberate financial relationship. With-
out these voluntary though vital agreements, the subsidiaries
would not only be unable to market their own musical product
abroad, but they would also be denied the exclusive right to
license the musical product developed by Sony Music in the
United States and by the other subsidiaries in their respective
countries.0 6 The subsidiaries sought to characterize the ma-
trix agreements as mere licensing arrangements and argued
that they could not be doing business in New York since the
agreements ultimately produced sales in their respective coun-
tries rather than in New York.0 7 Judge Sand, however, took
a broader, more practical view of the agreements and agreed
with the plaintiff that "the worldwide network of affiliates and
Sony Music is very important to the business of each affili-
ate.... , 2' 8 Although the matrix agreements do not in them-
selves involve financial transactions within the forum, the
exclusive licensing rights guaranteed by these agreements
point to the financial transactions that will inevitably result.
Second, while the terms of the matrix agreements do not
obligate any foreign subsidiary to license any particular musi-
cal release,0 9 Sony Music is the only party with the authority
to broker music product between itself and the subsidiaries.
The fact that this authority comes at the direction and with
the approval of the subsidiaries does not negate the fact that
Sony Music's efforts on their behalf bind them contractual-
ly. 10 Relevant to this analysis is the fact that the foreign
subsidiaries did not sign their matrix agreements with the
other foreign subsidiaries; rather, each subsidiary signed its
agreement with Sony Music in New York.' Therefore, the
204. 793 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). See supra notes 120-53 and accompa-
nying text.
205. See supra notes 13841 and accompanying text.
206. Palmieri, 793 F. Supp. at 1185.
207. Id. at 1190-91.
208. Id. at 1191.
209. Id. at 1185.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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foreign subsidiaries could have access to the musical product of
Sony Music and the other subsidiaries only through the matrix
agreements with Sony Music.
Because ongoing access to new musical product is critical
to the music industry, the matrix agreements affect what is
perhaps the most essential part of the subsidiaries' business.
Without access to the musical recordings of Sony Music and
the other subsidiaries, the individual foreign subsidiaries could
only market their own product in their respective countries,
thereby severely limiting their financial strength, product
diversity, and corporate viability.
Third, although Palmieri is not explicit about how long the
foreign subsidiaries have participated in the matrix agree-
ments, it is clear from the Larbal12 and Intersong212 opin-
ions that the foreign subsidiaries and Sony Music (along with
its predecessor in interest, CBS, Inc.) have been parties to
these agreements for a number of years. The ongoing nature of
this financial relationship between the parties to the
agreements demonstrates the likelihood of substantial finan-
cial benefits accruing to the foreign subsidiaries. It also lends
weight to the argument that these subsidiaries have had con-
tact with the forum "not occasionally or casually, but with a
fair measure of permanence and continuity."214
Finally, the foreign subsidiaries' financial involvement in
the forum is substantial. Although a stipulation between the
parties prevents public disclosure of the actual figures,215 the
court found that "defendants derive hundreds of millions of
dollars in profits from sales signed by Sony Music."" 6 A ma-
jor portion of the foreign subsidiaries' sales in their own coun-
tries is derived from product originally produced by Sony Mu-
sic. It is evident that the subsidiaries rely heavily on Sony
Music's expertise in selecting, nurturing, producing, and re-
212. Larball Publishing Co. v. CBS, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
213. Intersong-USA, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 0998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11645 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1990).
214. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917 (N.Y. 1917); see also
supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
216. Palmieri v. Estefan, 793 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The court
also noted that "in their memorandum of law, defendants concede that a substan-
tial percentage of the sales of the moving defendants are attributable to products
licensed to the moving defendants under the matrix agreements." Id. at 1191 n.10.
212 [Vol. XX: I
AGENCY THEORY JURISDICTION
cording the various musical acts that make up Sony Music's
repertoire. 17 Should the need arise, it is unlikely that the
subsidiaries would be able to assume these activities without
great difficulty.
By serving as both a clearinghouse and a storeroom for
musical product from around the world, Sony Music provides
its foreign subsidiaries with a convenient and economical way
to market its own products and acquire products from else-
where, particularly the United States. The court did not calcu-
late the cost that the subsidiaries would incur by attempting
such activity on their own within the forum, but it is likely
that these costs would be financially prohibitive. Based on the
considerable benefits accruing to the foreign subsidiaries by
way of their matrix agreements with Sony Music, it would not
be unreasonable for a court to hold that these benefits easily
outweigh the burdens the foreign subsidiaries might experi-
ence defending themselves in New York. Indeed, since New
York is the home of the parent corporation as well as the loca-
tion of recording studios sometimes used by the subsidiaries'
artists, it would be difficult for the subsidiaries to argue suc-
cessfully that jurisdiction should be denied based on the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens.
Palmieri easily meets all four factors of the EBT, a result
that neither conflicts with much of Judge Sand's analysis nor
with the ultimate decision. Jurisdiction over Sony Music's
foreign subsidiaries would result through the use of either the
agency theory or the EBT. By utilizing the EBT, however, the
court could avoid having to shoehorn the particular facts of
this case into the uncertain common law definition and appli-
cation of the agency theory. The EBT would eliminate the need
for the court to explain how an agency relationship exists even
when the parent corporation is serving as the agent for its
foreign subsidiaries. The EBT is neither intended nor would it
serve as a way for plaintiffs to hale foreign corporations into
the forum unfairly. It would not "open the floodgates." Rather,
the EBT simply provides the court with a clear and reasonable
way to assess the parties' jurisdictional claims and defenses.
The EBT allows the court to go right to the heart of the
jurisdictional analysis: How and to what extent did the foreign
217. Id.
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corporation benefit economically from its vicarious involvement
with a forum-based corporation? Thus, utilization of the EBT
will eliminate the conflicting opinions that have plagued many
of the cases in which the courts have invoked the agency theo-
ry. Although, in borderline cases, courts may differ in their
decisions, the EBT at least provides for a logical, fact-based
analysis of the jurisdictional issues.
The EBT is not, of course, the first test constructed to
assist the courts in determining whether to assert jurisdiction
under section 301. Courts addressing the question of whether a
subsidiary corporation is a mere department of the parent
corporation use the four-part test of Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp.218 to determine
whether they may pierce the corporate veil and hold that the
parent does business in the forum based on the acts of its
subsidiary. Just as the mere department test consolidated the
various theories related to the doctrine of piercing the corpo-
rate veil, so too does the EBT consolidate and clarify the theo-
ries related to agency and jurisdiction.
Armed with both the mere department test and the EBT,
courts would be able to decide these often thorny jurisdictional
issues in a more orderly and predictable manner. Both judges
and litigants will know in advance what evidence is relevant to
the issue, providing all concerned parties a considerable sav-
ings in time and money. Prompt resolutions will also allow
these cases to advance more quickly to the merits or to settle-
ment, rather than remaining bogged down in endless proce-
dure.
V. CONCLUSION
Agency, used as a metaphor for securing personal jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation under NY CPLR section 301, is
a vague and misleading legal theory. In applying this theory
over the last twenty-five years, courts in both the state and
federal systems have distorted the law of agency and have
issued conflicting opinions, even when cases have had nearly
identical facts. Since the leading "doing business" cases have
held that issues of control by the principal over the agent are
218. 751 F.2d 117, 120-22 (2d Cir. 1984). See supra notes 27-29 and accom-
panying text.
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not relevant for jurisdictional purposes pursuant to section
301, and the law of agency is concerned with assertions of
vicarious liability rather than assertions of vicarious jurisdic-
tion, the law of agency is an inherently inappropriate base for
a jurisdictional theory.
Consequently, the agency theory, as it applies to section
301, should be abandoned. It should be replaced by a jurisdic-
tional test that clearly, logically, and fairly determines whether
a foreign corporation is doing business in New York based on
the economic benefits it has received through the acts per-
formed on its behalf by a corporation residing within the fo-
rum.
Michael G. Albano

